Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 2

Article 5

January 1986

Fisher v. City of Berkeley: Applying Due Process
and Preemption to Rent Control Ordinances
Scott T. Dunning

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Housing Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Scott T. Dunning, Fisher v. City of Berkeley: Applying Due Process and Preemption to Rent Control Ordinances, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
(1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Dunning: Rent Control

FISHER v. CITY OF BERKELEY:
APPLYING DUE PROCESS AND
PREEMPTION TO RENT
CONTROL ORDINANCES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,1 the California Supreme
Court addressed the validity of Berkeley's latest rent control ordinance. 2 With the exception of a retaliatory eviction provision, 3
the court upheld the ordinance against all challenges.' These
challenges included alleged due process violations,1I and claims
that certain provisions in the ordinance were preempted by state
law. 6
The Fisher court discussed five relevant issues: 1) the facial
validity of the ordinance's rate of return standard;7 2) the facial
1. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
2. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5261-N.S., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good
Cause Ordinance (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as Ordinance].
3. Id. § 14. This section creates a presumption that any eviction within six months
after a tenant has exercised his or her rights under the ordinance is retaliatory. Id.
4. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 669, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690. The court also
addressed two other issues that will not be discussed in this Note. In 1982, the United
States Supreme Court held that municipalities were subject to antitrust scrutiny. Community Communications Co. v Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). Based upon the arguments
raised in Boulder, Berkeley's landlords attacked the ordinance as violating the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 655, 693 P.2d at 271, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address that issue, and decided that
Berkeley's ordinance did not violate antitrust laws. See Fisher v. Berkeley, No. 84-1538,
slip op. at 9-10 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1986). The California Supreme Court also addressed an
equal protection argument, but it summarily dismissed that argument as bearing a debatable rational relationship to the legitimate public purpose of the ordinance. Fisher, 37
Cal. 3d at 684, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . . " Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. U[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
6. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. uA county or city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with
general laws." Id. (Emphasis added.)
7. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710. This issue refers
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validity of the ordinance's rate adjustment procedures;8 3)
whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
the alienation of property;9 4) the validity of the ordinance's retaliatory eviction provisions;Io and 5) the validity of the ordinance's rent withholding provisions. l l This Note will analyze the
Fisher court's thorough evaluation of each issue. Furthermore,
this Note will consider the significance of future due process and
preemption challenges to rent control in light of the Fisher
decision.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fisher decision arose when residential landlords in the
City of Berkeley challenged the validity of Berkeley's rent control ordinance, and sued for injunctive and declaratory relief. I2
The landlords raised concerns regarding the ordinance's formula
for establishing and adjusting rents, its ultimate effect on the
value of rental properties, and the validity of certain provisions
established to ensure compliance with the ordinance. I3 To protect their interests, the landlords brought an action charging
that the ordinance either violated their guarantee of due process
or that the ordinance was preempted by state law. I"
to the validity of the ordinance's formula for setting and adjusting rent levels.
8. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. This issue refers to the validity
of the procedures established by the ordinance for implementing the rate of return
standard.
9. [d. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720. This issue refers to the potential
preemption of provisions in the ordinance by California Civil Code § 711, which prohibits restraints on alienation; the provisions in the ordinance restrict rent adjustments that
are necessary to cover cost increases resulting from the sale or refinancing of rental property acquired after adoption of the ordinance. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
10. Fisher at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721. This issue refers to the
potential preemption of a provision in the ordinance by California Evidence Code § 500,
which allocates burdens of proof. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). There are provisions in the ordinance that purport to protect tenants from evictions by landlords who
retaliate against tenants who exercise their rights under the ordinance. One provision
establishes a presumption regarding retaliatory evictions, and this issue refers to the validity of that provision. See supra note 3.
11. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. This issue refers
to the due process and preemption challenges to the use of rent withholding by tenants
to force landlords to comply with the ordinance.
12. [d. at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
13. See generally id. at 679-709, 693 P.2d at 289-312, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-33.
14. [d.
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Both due process and preemption are doctrines that have
different meanings depending on the circumstances of each
case. 11I Generally, due process ensures that statutory procedures
and purposes, at all levels of government, are "reasonable"
under the circumstances. IS Preemption, on the other hand, is a
limitation on inferior governmental entities that regulate in conflict with the statutory schemes of superior governmental entities. I7 In Fisher, the court applied these doctrines to the specific
provisions of Berkeley's rent control ordinance. IS
15. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). "Due process is an elusive concept.
Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual
contexts." Id. at 442. See also In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857
(1962). "[Wlhether the state has fully occupied a field with respect to any given subject
depends upon considerations which will necessarily vary and must therefore be determined in every case . . . . " Id. at 110, 372 P.2d at 899, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
16. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
If the laws passed seem to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied ...
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevent to the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . . .
Id. at 537-39. Nebbia is regarded as the first case in which the United States Supreme
Court abandoned the philosophy of economic due process, where regulated businesses
had to be affected with a public interest before a regulation would be considered legitimate. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941). In Nebbia, the Court repudiated
its prior strict scrutiny approach to economic regulations, and declared that it would
defer to the legislature unless a particular legislation was not rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
17. See Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles. 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384
P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
The doctrine of state preemption becomes a determining factor only when a political subdivision (not necessarily a
chartered city) attempts to legislate under its admitted police
power [CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 111 on a subject that the state
also has legislated upon. The question then arises as to
whether the subject matter of the legislation has not been preempted by the state.
60 Cal. 2d at 292 n.ll, 384 P.2d at 168 n'l1' 32 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.l1.
18. In order to facilitate a due process analysis, the general purposes of the ordinance are as follows:
[Tlo regulate residential rent increases in the City of Berkeley
and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and
arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory evictions, in order to
help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley community and to
ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to rental
housing. This legislation is designed to address the City of
Berkeley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace, health
and safety, and advance the housing policies of this City with
regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students,
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The first group of provisions considered by the court deals
with the ordinance's rate of return standard. IS The rate of return
standard, or "fair return standard," establishes a formula for
setting and adjusting rent ceilings. 20 In Berkeley's ordinahce,
that formula is administered by a regulatory board that is required to apply the formula in different ways depending upon
the prevailing circumstances. 21 The most important section of
the ordinance states, "No provision of this Ordinance shall be
applied so as to prohibit the Board from granting an individual
rent adjustment that is demonstrated necessary by the landlord
to provide the landlord with a fair return on investment."22 One
handicapped, and the aged.
See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3.
19. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
20. See generally Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 781-817 (1983). The term "fair return standard" refers
to the United States Supreme Court's declaration that failure to provide a fair return is
a taking of property without due process of law. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47
(1898). There are an infinite number of potential rate of return formulas including: the
maintenance of cash flow, the return on value, the percentage net operating income, the
return on investment, and the maintenance of net operating income. See generally Baar,
supra at 781-817. The use of various rate of return standards has been routinely accepted by the courts; in Fisher, the court reiterated, "[S)election of an administrative
standard by which to set rent ceilings is a task for local governments-in this cases the
voters themselves-and not the courts." Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 712. The court also added that, " '[R)ent control agencies are not obliged by
either the state or federal Constitution to fix rents by application of any particular
method or formula.' " [d. at 680, 693 P.2d at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citing Carson
Mobilehome Park Owner's Assn. v. City of Cltrson, 35 Cal. 3d 184, 191, 672 P.2d 1297,
1300, 197 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287 (1983».
21. See generally Ordinance, supra note 2. Section 6 of the ordinance established a
nine member regulatory board and sets out its powers, duties, rules and procedures. [d. §
6. Section 11 provides:
In adjusting ceilings under this subsection, the Board shall
adopt a formula or formulas of general application. This
formula will be based upon the annual rent registration forms,
surveys, information and testimonies presented at public hearings, and other available data indicating increases or decreases
in the expenses relating to the rental housing market in the
City of Berkeley set forth in this subsectioon.
[d. § 11(b).
22. [d. § 12(i). Berkeley's standard is actually a hybrid of the return on investment
and maintenance of net operating income standards. The return on investment standard
is calculated as follows: gross rent = operating expenses + mortgage payments + cash
investments. The maintenance of net operating income standard is calculated as follows:
gross rent = base date gross rent + (current operating expenses - base date operating
expenses). Baar, supra note 20, at 784. Berkeley's ordinance, in §§ 10 and 11, established
a base rent income and required adjustments to cover increases in costs, i.e., a maintenance of net operating income approach where actual profits stay the same. See Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 10, 11. Section 12, on the other hand, provides, "It is the intent

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss2/5

4

Dunning: Rent Control

1986]

RENT CONTROL

373

of the major issues that faced the Fisher court was to determine
whether a fair return on investment is valid under the due process clause.
A similar group of provisions challenged by the landlords is
the rent adjustment procedures. 23 In order to implement the
rate of return standard, the ordinance includes certain mechanisms which may be used by the Regulatory Board. 24 One mechanism is the general or citywide adjustment, which allows the
Board to grant adjustments to general categories of residential
properties. 211 Another mechanism is the adjustment by individual
petition. 2s This method, however, is more time consuming then
the general adjustment, and the landlords attacked the potential
delay as violating their guarantee of due process. 27
Another alleged due process violation regarded the ordinance's rent withholding provisions. 28 These provisions allow a
tenant to withhold rents whenever a landlord does not comply
with the ordinance. 29 Specifically, tenants are allowed to withof this Ordinance that individual upward adjustments in the rent ceilings on units be
made only when the landlord demonstrates that such adjustments are necessary to provide the landlord with a fair return on investment." Id. § 12(c)(10).
23. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
24. See Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 11, 12.
25. Id. § l1(a) which provides in part: "Once each year, the Board shall consider
setting and adjusting the rent ceiling for all rental units covered by this Ordinance in
general and/or particular categories of rental units covered by this Ordinance deemed
appropriate by the Board." Id.
26. Id. § 12(a) which provides in part: "Upon receipt of a petition by a landlord
and/or tenant, the rent ceiling of individual controlled rental units may be adjusted upward or downward in accordance with the procedures set forth elsewhere in this Section." Id.
27. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. "Property may
be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to
confiscatory rates as by express affirmance of them . . . . " Id. (citing Smith v. Illiinois
Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926».
28. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
29. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(I), (a)(2).
If a landlord fails to register in accordance with Section 8 of
this Ordinance, or if a landlord demands, accepts, receives or
retains any payment in excess of the maximum allowable rent
permitted by this Ordinance, a tenant may take any or all of
the following actions until compliance is achieved: (1) A tenant may petition the Board for appropriate relief. If the
Board, after the landlord has proper notice and after a hearing, determines that a landlord has willfully and knowingly
failed to register a rental unit covered by this Ordinance or
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hold rents if landlords fail to comply with the ordinance's rent
ceilings so or with the ordinance's registration requirements. 3t
The basis of the landlords' argument was that the tenants were
not qualified to interpret the ordinance, or to determine whether
or not the landlords had complied with it. s2 Alternatively, the
landlords pointed to certain state statutes that govern rent withholding, and claimed that these statutes preempt the ordinance's rent withholding provisions. ss
According to the landlords, other ordinance provisions were
preempted by state law. The Berkeley landlords were concerned
about the ordinance's effect on the sale and financing of rental
property, and therefore, they argued that certain provisions in
the ordinance created an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of property.s, Specifically, the landlords pointed to provisions in the ordinance which establish that a landlord-owner
may not obtain a rent increase based upon increased carrying
costs arising out of a recent sale or a refinancing of rental property.311 It was the landlords' contention that this result was exviolated the provisions of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of this Ordinance, the Board may authorize the tenant of such rental unit
to withhold all or a portion of the rent for the unit until such
time as the rental unit is brought into compliance with this
Ordinance . . . . (2) A tenant may withhold up to the full
amount of his or her periodic rent which is charged or demanded by the landlord under the provisions of this Ordinance. In any action to recover possession based on nonpayment of rent, possession shall not be granted where the tenant
has withheld rent in good faith under this Section.
[d.
30. [d. § 10. This section provides for a base rent ceiling that sets ceilings at those
rents being charged as of May 31, 1980. [d. Changes in those rent ceilings are governed
by the general and individual adjustment mechanisms contained in §§ 11 and 12 of the
ordinance. ld. §§ 11, 12.
31. [d. § 8. This section requires landlords to register with the Board, to provide
certain specified information, and to pay a registration fee for each unit. ld.
32. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699-704,693 P.2d at 304-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725-29.
33. ld. at 704-09, 693 P.2d at 308-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-32.
34. ld. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
35. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12(d), (e). These sections provide in full:
(d) No individual upward adjustment of a rent ceiiling shall be
authorized by the Board by reason of increased interest or
other expenses resulting from the landlord's refinancing the
rental unit if, at the time the landlord refinanced, the landlord
could reasonably have foreseen that such increased expenses
could not be covered by the rent schedule then in existence.
except where such refinancing is necessary for the landlord to
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pressly prohibited by state law. 36
The landlords also claimed that a retaliatory eviction provision in the Berkeley ordinance is in direct conflict with state
law. 37 This provision establishes a presumption that any eviction
within six months of a tenant's assertion of rights under the ordinance is retaliatory.38 Of all the due process and preemption
challenges raised in Fisher, only this retaliatory eviction presumption was struck down by the California Supreme Court. 39
After discussing the five relevant issues of the case separately,
the court severed the retaliatory eviction presumption from the
rest of the ordinance.· o
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Fisher court analyzed a number of issues challenged on
make capital improvements which meet the criteria set forth
in Section 12(c)(3). This paragraph shall only apply to that
portion of the increased expenses resulting from the refinancing that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the refinancing of the rental unit and shall only apply to rental units
refinanced after the date of adoption of this Ordinance.
(e) Except for cases of individual hardship as set forth in Subsection 12(i) of this Ordinance, no individual upward adjustment of a rent ceiling shall be authorized by the Board because of the landlord's increased interest or other expenses
resulting from the sale of the property, if at the time the landlord acquired the property, the landlord could have reasonably
foreseen that such increaaed expenses would not be covered by
the rent schedule then in effect. This Subsection [12(e)] shall
only apply to rental units acquired after the date of adoption
of this Ordinance.
[d.

36. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 692, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
37. [d. at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 72l.
38. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. This section provides in part:

In an action by or against a tenant, evidence of the aasertion
or exercise by the tenant of rights under this Ordinance within
six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation shall create a
presumption that the landlord's act was retaliatory. "Presumption" means that the Court must find the existence of
the fact presumed unless and until its nonexistence is proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.
[d. This retaliatory eviction provision was amended in 1982 when Berkeley enacted the
Tenant's Rights Amendment Act of 1982 in order to revise certain sections of the
ordinance.
39. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
40. [d.
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either due process or preemption grounds. The ordinance's rate
of return standard, the rate adjustment procedures, and certain
rent withholding provision were attacked by the Berkeley landlords as violative of due process. u Additionally, the landlords alleged that the retaliatory eviction presumption, the provision
precluding a rent increase due to increased costs arising out of a
recent sale or refinancing, and certain rent withholding provisions were preempted by state law. 42 The court applied a different due process and preemption analysis to the various challenged ordinance provisions.

A.

FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RATE OF
RETURN STANDARD

The landlords contended that the return on investment
standard in the Berkeley ordinance violated their due process
rights. 43 The court based its determination of whether the ordinance violated the landlords' guarantee of due process primarily
upon its definition of the term "investment." Unless the landlords could have shown that the return on investment standard
was unreasonable, the court could not have found that the standard was a confiscation of property without due process of law!·
The court began its analysis by stating, "[W]hether rental
regulations are fair or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached."411 Nevertheless, the court was willing to consider a
facial challenge to the ordinance in order to determine whether
its terms would permit those who administered it, to avoid confiscatory results in its actual application. 46 The court decided
that if the return on investment standard would afford sufficient
flexibility in its administration and avoided confiscatory results,
it would uphold the ordinance. 47
41. [d. at 679-709, 693 P.2d at 289-312, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-33.
42. [d.
43. [d. at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710. Although most of the ordi-

nance established a maintenance of net operating income standard, § 12(8) explains that
it is the purpose of the ordinance to grant upward rent adjustments only to ensure landlords a fair return on investment. See supra note 22.
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
46. [d. at 679, 693 P.2d at 290, 209 Cal. Rtpr. at 710.
47. [d. at 682, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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The landlords argued that a fair rate of return must be
based on the fair market value of their properties rather than
upon the investment they personally put into those properties. 48
Some of the landlords had significant equity in their real estate
with little or no investment,49 and they feared that the return on
investment standard would leave them with little or no rental
income; the landlords were concerned that any reasonable interpretation of the term investment would lead to a confiscatory
result. 60 The court, however, disagreed with this interpretation
of the investment standard, and rejected the claim that a return
on value standard was required by the ordinance.1Il
Significantly, the court found that the ordinance does not
confine investment to a restrictive interpretation. 52 It asserted
that, in appropriate cases, the Board may consider a landlord's
personal labor in improving his property as an investment. 53
Furthermore, the court explained that if a landlord has acquired
his property by gift or inheritance, there is nothing in the ordi48. [d. at 680-81, 693 P.2d at 290-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
49. [d. at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. In this context, "equity" means

an interest in property in excess of claims or liens (such as mortgage indebtedness)
against it; "investment" refers to an expenditure of money for income or profit-a capital outlay.
50. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
51. [d. at 680-85, 693 P.2d at 290-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. 711-15. The return on value
standard determines fair return by focusing on the market value of a landlord's property;
this standard was first used in a railroad rate regulation case in which the United States
Supreme Court held that railroads were entitled to rates sufficient to produce a fair return on the market value of their assets. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898). However, the holding in Smyth was rejected in a utility rate regulation case in which the
Court stated that, "[R)ates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value
of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated."
Power Commission v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). The Fisher court, after
quoting this language from Hope Gas explained, "Implicit in this statement is the sug- gestion that a return on fair value standard is circular and unworkable." Fisher, 37 Cal.
3d at 681 n.33, 693 P.2d at 290 n.33, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.33.
The value of any income producing asset is a function of its earning potential; just
as a bond providing 1O~;, interest every year is more valuable than an identical bond
providing only 5~;, in interest each year, a rental property producing $100 each month is
more valuable than a similar property producing only $50 each month. If a potential
buyer were to consider purchasing the two properties, he would logically consider the $50
difference in income each month in determining what he was willing to pay for the property; a logical buyer would be willing to pay up to the present value of the $50 difference
each month on top of the original value of the first property. See Baar, supra note 20, at
798-803.
52. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
53. [d.
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nance to preclude the Board from using the transferor's investment in the property to determine the landlord's investment. 54
Moreover, the court contended that the Board was not prohibited from considering certain forms of investment such as mortgage payments toward principal, or cash later invested to Improve the property.1I11
The return on investment standard was also attacked by the
landlords as unfairly depriving them of the full long term appreciation value of their properties. 1I8 In making this argument, the
landlords tried to establish that they were entitled to the full
market value of their rentals, if the properties were earning
rents at a competitive market rate. 1I7 As argued by the landlords,
they were entitled to the full capitalization value of their properties, which is calculated by factoring the present value of rental
income to be earned in the future and combining that with the
properties' intrinsic land value.1I8
The court rejected this contention, and premised its analysis upon "taking" cases that have upheld regulations except if an
owner has been deprived of "substantially all reasonable use of
the property."119 As explained by the coUrt, some lessening of appreciation is a necessary result of rent control because appreciation is often a function of increased rental income. 8o The court
stated, "It is one of the very sources of long-term appreciation-inflated rents-that rent control measures are intended to
restrict. "81
In a similar argument, the landlords requested the court to
54. [d.
55. [d. Ultimately, the court decided that the return on investment standard is flexi-

ble enough to allow the Board to avoid confiscatory results in the standard's application.
[d.
56. [d. This is the same as demanding a fair return on value standard instead of a
fair return on investment. See Comment, Rethinking Rent Control: An Analysis of "Fair
Return," 12 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 640 (1981). See also supra note 51 (explaining the relationship between property value and the potential rental income from that property).
57. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
58. [d. See also supra note 51.
59. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 686, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (citing Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979».
60. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
61. [d. (citing Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d
280, 290, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1983».
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find that, as a matter or law, investment should include the effect of inflation on the landlords' initial investment. 62 One section in the ordinance sets rent levels at the rents being charged
as of May 31, 1~80;63 the landlords argued that unless the investment standard would be interpreted to include the effect of inflation, their profits would steadily erode over time. 6 " As noted
by the court, if a fixed profit amount eventually loses real value,
that result is potentially just as confiscatory as if the Board had
set its own confiscatory rate. 61i
Although the court refused to invalidate the ordinance because the ordinance failed to account for the effect of inflation,
the court basically accepted the landlords' inflation argument. 66
The court's reasoning, however, prompted it to reach the opposite conclusion from that of the landlords; rather than using the
absence of inflation language as a means of criticizing the ordinance, the court pointed to this omission as providing the Board
with sufficient flexibility to avoid confiscatory results. 67 The
court found that it was not apparent that the ordinance precluded the application of necessary adjustments to account for
inflation. 68 Furthermore, it was even less clear that the Board
would decline to invoke its powers to adjust individual profit
amounts. The court explained, " '[I]t is to be presumed that the
board will exercise its powers in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution; and if it does act unfairly, the fault
lies with the board and not the statute.' "69

62. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 682, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
63. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 10.
64. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 682, 693 P.2d at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. If landlords' profits were fixed at the 1980 level, the real value of those profits would diminish
over time; $1,000 of purchasing power in 1980, given, for example, an inflation rate of
1O~';" would buy only $100 of the same goods 10 years into the future.
65. [d. at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The court stated, "[Ajlthough
defendants' ordinance may properly restrict landlords' profits on their rental investments, it may not indefinitely freeze the dollar amount of those profits without eventually causing confiscatory results." [d. (Emphasis in original.)
66. [d. at 684, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
67. [d.
68. [d.
69. [d. (citing Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 149, 82 P.2d 434, 439 (1938».
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THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RATE
ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES

The court next decided the constitutional validity of the adjustment mechanisms used to implement the rate of return standard. 70 A few years earlier, California's Supreme Court had considered the constitutionality of another Berkeley rent control
ordinance, and had found that the adjustment procedures in
that ordinance were confiscatory.71 According to that court, an
adjustment mechanism "is sufficient for the required purpose
only if it is capable of providing adjustments in maximum rents
without a substantially greater incidence and degree of delay
than is practically necessary. "72
The Fisher court praised Berkeley's present ordinance, however, for correcting all of the problems of the prior ordinance. 73
The court decided that the current ordinance avoids the confiscatory delays inherent in the prior ordinance's unit-by-unit procedure; the current ordinance provides for general citywide increases to cover common costs that affect the entire city, thus
avoiding the unnecessary delays inherent in hearing individual
petitions. 74 Additionally, for those peculiar situations that require review of individual petitions, the court found that the
current ordinance's individual adjustment procedures are
designed to assure reasonably prompt considerations of the
landlords' claims.7I!
According to the court, the original Berkeley ordinance
placed the Regulatory Board in "a procedural strait jacket."76
That ordinance did not allow petitions unless they were accompanied by building code compliance certificates, it gave the
Board no power to consolidate petitions, and it gave the Board
no power to delegate its authority to review petitions." On the
70. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
71. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 173, 550 P.2d 1001, 1033, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 497 (1976).
72. [d. at 169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
73. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 690, 693 P.2d at 297, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
74. [d. at 691,693 P.2d at 298,209 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (citing Ordinance, supra note 2,
§ 11).

75. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 691, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
76. [d. at 690, 693 P.2d at 297, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
77. [d. at 690, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
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contrary, the current ordinance requires the Board to consolidate petitions, make all adjustment decisions within 120 days,
and appoint hearing officers if necessary.78 The result of these
provisions, according to the court, is to provide the Board with
sufficient flexibility to avoid confiscatory results. 79
C.

WHETHER THE ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINT ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

Another issue considered by the court was whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of
property.80 Specifically, the court considered the validity of provisions that prevent the Board from granting a rent adjustment
to cover increased costs arising from a recent sale or refinancing
of rental property.81 The landlords argued that these provisions·
unreasonably restrain alienation and are, therefore, directly preempted by the California Civil Code. 82
The court not only rejected this preemption argument, but
also upheld the provisions on due process, rational basis
grounds. 83 According to the court, the purpose of these provisions is to prevent landlords from manipulating their costs in
order to create a higher rental income. 84 To prevent this result,
two "antispeculation" clauses are included to prevent landlords
from passing on to their tenants the cost of the landlords' speculation in the housing market. 81i The court concluded, "If this latter aspect were unregulated, use of the investment standard
might defeat the purpose of rent price regulation. "86
Additionally, the court considered whether the prOVISIons
are directly preempted by the Civil Code. 87 Section 711 of the
Civil Code expressly prohibits restraints on the alienation of
78. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12.
79. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
80. Id. at 691, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
81. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 12(d)(e).
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982). "Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." Id.
83. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 691-92, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
84.ld.
85.ld.
86.ld.
87. [d. at 692, 693 P.2d at 299, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
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property.88 Traditionally, however, this section has only applied
to conditions in contracts of conveyance which are unreasonable
restraints. 89 In rejecting the preemption challenge in this area,
the court found that the restraints in the ordinance are reasonable, and ultimately, that section 711 of the Civil Code has no
application to restraints created by local ordinances. 9o
The court noted that its review of the relevant section of
the Civil Code revealed that the section was meant to address
only private restraints on alienation, and was never intended to
apply to municipal ordinances. According to the court, "[T]he
rule against restraints on 'alienation is directed against the provisions in contracts or conveyances. It has no application to disabling restraints established by express statute.' " By interpeting
"express statute" as including municipal ordinances, the court
effectively dismissed any further preemption issue in this area.
D. VALIDITY

OF THE ORDINANCE'S RETALIATORY
EVICTION PRESUMPTION

Another preemption argument raised by the landlords was
that a provision in the ordinance that creates a presumption regarding retaliatory eviction, directly conflicts with California's
Evidence Code. 9s Most rent control ordinances contain retaliatory eviction provisions to protect tenants when they attempt to
exercise their rights. 94 One important protection is the general
rule that a retaliatory eviction is a complete defense to an unlawful detainer action. 911 Berkeley's ordinance reiterates this defense, but adds a presumption that any eviction within six
months of a tenant exercising rights created by the ordinance is
88. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 (1977). See also Coast Bank v.
Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964) (restraint in an equitable mortgage requiring consent by the creditor before the property
could be transferred was found to be a reasonable restraint on alienation, and therefore,
valid).
90. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW (8th ed. 1973) and RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 403, 404 (1944)).
93. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
94. See Baar, supra note 20, at 833.
95. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 517, 476 P.2d 97, 103,90 Cal. Rptr.
729, 735 (1970).
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retaliatory.96
The ordinance provides, "'Presumption' means that the
Court must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and
until its nonexistence is proven by a preponderance of the evidence."97 In contrast, section 500 of the California Evidence
Code states, "Except as otherwise provided by law a party has
the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence
of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is
asserting. "98 Pointing to this language, the landlords argued that
the rent control ordinance is directly preempted by the Evidence
Code. 99
The court agreed, and found that the Evidence Code directly preempts the retaliatory eviction presumption. 1oo In order
to arrive at this conclusion, the court established that the ordinance creates a presumption affecting the burden of proof as set
forth in section 500 of the Evidence Code. As a basis for its contention, the court relied upon two arguments used by the landlords. First, the language of the amended version of the ordinance is almost identical to the language of the Evidence Code
that defines a presumption affecting the burden of proof. IOI Second, the city's attempt to support the presumption on public
policy grounds indicates that the presumption is one affecting
the burden of proof; the Evidence Code defines these presumptions as implementing some type of public policy.lo2
96.
97.
98.
burden
99.

See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14.
See id.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966). This section refers to the party who has the
of proof. [d.
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
100. [d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
10l. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 606 (West 1966). This section states, "The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of proof is to impose upon the party against whom it
operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact." [d.
102. [d. § 605. A presumption affecting the burden of proof is intended to establish
some public policy; a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence, on the
other hand, is one intended to facilitate only the determination of the particular action
in which it is applied, and is not intended to establish or implement any public policy.
[d. § 603. It should be noted that the pre-amendment version of the ordinance contained
a presumption completely identical to Evidence Code § 603 defining a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. The change in language is another indication
that the city did not intend the retaliatory eviction presumption to affect the burden of
producing evidence.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5

384

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:369

Additionally, the court noted that the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" language of section 500 of the Evidence
Code l03 combined with section 160 of the Evidence Code,104 further indicates preemption. 1011 Section 160 of the Evidence Code
defines "law" as including constitutional, statutory, and decisionallaw. l06 Moreover, the court, relying on precedent, asserted
that the legislature never intended municipal ordinances to be
included in the exception for law provided in the Evidence
Code. l07 Although the court pointed to cases in which other
courts have suggested that the term statute may include local
ordinances, the Fisher court decided that an ordinance is void to
the extent that it purports to establish rules of evidence. l08

E.

VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE'S RENT WITHHOLDING
PROVISIONS

The landlords' final challenge was to the rent withholding
provisions in the ordinance. l09 Two provisions in the ordinance
allow tenants to withhold rents whenever landlords fail to comply with either the rent ceilings in effect or with the ordinance's
registration process. 110 The landlords challenged these provisions
on both due process and preemption grounds. 11l
1.

The Due Process Challenge

The Berkeley landlords aimed their due process challenge of
the rent withholding provisions at the provision that allows a
tenant to unilaterally withhold rents if a landlord fails to comply
with the ordinance. ll2 Specifically, this provision allows a tenant
to withhold rents, and provides that in an action to recover rents
or possession, a landlord will be denied rent if he has failed to
comply wiith the ordinance, and denied possession if the tenant
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. § 500 (West 1966).
See id. § 160 (West 1966).
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 160 (1966).
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
[d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
[d. at 699, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(1).
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 699-709, 293 P.2d at 304-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725-32.
See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(2).
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has acted in good faith. ll3
The due proceess challenge was made on several grounds.
First, the landlords attacked the reasonableness of the provision. ll • In general, all provisions must be reasonably related to
the purpose of an ordinance. lUI Second, the landlords claimed
that the terms of the withholding provision are vague. 1lS This
challenge suggested that the ordinance's terms fail to provide
notice of what would constitute a legal withholding of rents.ll7
Third, the landlords argued that the rent withholding provision
is confiscatory.118 The landlords claimed that they were being
deprived of their rents without a fair hearing before a legitimate
public authority.ll9
Initially, the court decided that the rent withholding provision is reasonably related to the purposes of the ordinance.
Under the ordinance, landlords are required to register their
rental units with the Regulatory Board and are assessed a fee for
each unit;120 these funds provide the Board with money to enforce the ordinance. 121 Unfortunately, if the landlords failed to
register, the Board would be unable to function. The Berkeley
ordinance, however, establishes that a tenant may withhold rent
if a landlord does not register. 122 Therefore, according to the
court, the rent withholding provision is critical to ensure landlord registration; the registration process is rationally related to
the ordinance's legitimate purposes. 123
The court also determined that the rent withholding provi113. See id.
114. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 700, 693 P.2d at 305, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
116. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 727.
117. See generally Note, Due Progress Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes,
62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948).
118. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
119. See Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 915 (1971)
(explaining that due process of law requires that before a person is deprived of life, liberty or property, he must be given notice of the proceeding against him, an opportunity
to defend himself, and the deprivation must be in a manner consistent with essential
fairness).
120. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 6.
121. See id.
122. See id. § 15(a)(I), (a)(2). 'For the text of the relevant rent withholding provision, see supra note 29.
123. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d. at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
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sion is not unconstitutionally vague. lU As explained by the
court, it would uphold the provision if the provision gives fair
notice to the landlords of their responsibilities regarding compliance, and if it provides reasonably adequate standards to guide
enforcement. 12Ii The court decided that the ordinance includes
an adequate description of who may use the remedy, who determines whether a landlord has violated the ordinance, what
amount may be withheld, and when the rent withholding should
be discontinued. us
Furthermore, the court found that under the Berkeley ordinance, "tenant" is confined to a lessee, assignee, or sublessee
who believes in "good faith" that he is being charged excessive
rents or that he lives in an unregistered apartment.127 It also determined that the final arbiter of whether a landlord has complied with the ordinance is the trial court when the landlord
sues to evict for nonpayment of rent.12S Moreover, the court concluded that the ordinance clearly establishes that a tenant may
withhold up to the full amount of periodic rent up until the trial
court confirms that a landlord has complied with the ordinance. 129 According to the court, the terms of the ordinance provide adequate notice of the conduct required to comply with it,
and establish reasonably adequate standards to guide
enforcement. 180
Finally, the court ruled that the withholding provision does
not create a confiscation of rent without due process; rather it
provides a defense to an unlawful detainer action. 18l The court
stated, "[T]he applicability of the withholding provision and the
qualified defense it confers comes into question only after the
landlord has initiated a wrongful detainer action. The provision
affords the landlord no less due process protection than he
would have normally."182 The court concluded that, at most, the
provision establishes a "substantive defense to unlawful detainer
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
128.
130.
131.
132.

[d. at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
[d. at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727.

[d. at 702-03, 693 P.2d at 306-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
[d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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The Preemption Challenge

California has two different preemption doctrines in its constitution: a general doctrine covering most cities, and a specific
doctrine relating to chartered cities. ls4 Although Berkeley is a
chartered city, the landlords conceded that rent control is a municipal affair over which chartered cities are given exclusive
power to legislate. 1311 Thus, Berkeley is subject to the general
rule that a city may make and enforce regulations that are not in
conflict with general laws. 138
, The Berkeley landlords argued that the rent withholding
provisions are not only in direct conflict with general laws, and
therefore, directly preempted, but that the provisions are also
impliedly preempted by extensive state regulation in the area. lS7
The landlords based their argument upon three specific statutes
that they claimed occupy the field of "when rent is due."138
However, the court rejected these preemption claims and concluded that the rent withholding provisions are not actually rent
withholding provisions, but substantive defenses to eviction
suits. 139
Initially, the court dealt with the direct preemption argument in terms of section 1161 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure that describes when a person is guilty of unlawful detainer.l(O Interestingly, the court dismissed the relevant provi133. Id. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
134. CAL. CONST, art. XI, § 5(a). This section allows chartered cities to legislate exclusively in areas considered "municipal affairs." Id.
135. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See CAL CONST.
art. XI, § 5(a).
136. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
137. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 705, 693 P.2d at 308-09, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
138. 1) CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1161 (West 1982) (this section describes the circumstances under which a tenant is guilty of uhlawful detainer); 2) CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947
(West 1985)(this section provides the timing for the payment of rent when there is no
usage or contract to the contrary); and 3) CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1985) (this section
provides circumstances under which a tenant may withhold rents in order to use them to
repair deficiencies in the premises).
139. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 706-09, 693 P.2d at 309-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730-32.
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1161 (West 1982).
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sion as procedural, even though the court had already determined that the rent withholding provisions are substantive. 141
Additionally, the court rejected the landlords' contention that
two other statutes are preemptive; the court determined that
these statutes do not concern defenses to eviction suits.142 The
court concluded, "[M]erely because defendants' ordinance 'imposes restraints which the State law does not, does not spell out
a conflict between State and local law. On the contrary, the absence of a statutory restraint is the very occasion for municipal
initiative.' "143
The landlords' preemption by implication argument was
similarly rejected by the court.144 In dismissing this preemption
challenge, the court relied upon an established three step preemption by implication analysis. HI! This analysis is based upon
an examination of state statutes regulating the same field, their
volume and content, and the effect of the local regulation on
transient citizens. 146 As noted by the court, coverage of the field
of rent withholding is not complete enough to indicate that it
has become an exclusive matter of state concern. 147 Furthermore, neither the quantity nor the content of the statutes imply
a legislative intent to occupy the field of rent withholding to the
exclusion of municipally created defenses to unlawful detainer
actions.148 Finally, rather than adversely affect transient citizens,
to the extent they may be affected, the court found that the ordinance will probably have a positive effect on these
individuals.149
141. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 706, 693 P.2d at 309-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
142. Id. at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
143. Id. (citing Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, _ , 303 A.2d 298,
307 (1973».
144. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707-09, 693 P.2d at 310-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
145. Id. at 708, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (citing Galvan v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 859-60, 452 P.2d 930, 935-36, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647-48 (1969».
The three step analysis asks: 1) is the subject matter so fully and completely covered by
general law so as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state
concern; 2) has the subject matter been partially covered by general law and couched in
terms that clearly indicate a paramount state concern which will tolerate no further local
action; or 3) has the subject matter been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect on the transient citizens of the state
outweighs the possible benefits to the local community. [d.
146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
147. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
148. Id.
149. Id. This result was predestined by the court's determination that the rent with-
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IV. ANALYSIS

The court's analysis of the due process and preemption
challenges raised in Fisher demonstrates that only· in rare circumstances will the court strike down a rent control ordinance.
The Fisher decision involved a variety of applications of due
process and preemption. In general, there are two distinct approaches to analyzing due process and preemption,1110 and these
approaches can be further divided. lII1 A due process attack may
refer either to procedural due process l112 or to substantive due
process. lila However, in both situations, a court's analysis is primarily concerned with the reasonableness and essential fairness
of the terms involved. 111. Preemption, on the other hand, may
involve either a direct conflict with a state statute, or, in the
case of preemption by implication, there may be certain factors
that imply a legislative intent to exclusively occupy an area of
law. 11111

A.

DUE PROCESS

The court's due process analysis raised two important issues: the reasonableness, or rational relationship of the terms of
the ordinance to its legitimate purpose of regulating rents, and
the distinction between procedural and substantive due process
in the context of rent control. The court's discussion of these
two issues demonstrates the limited future relevance of due process challenges to rent control.
Courts have consistently held that rent control is a reasonaholding provisions are substantive defenses to eviction suits, and not procedural mechanisms for confiscating the landlords' rents.
150. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
151. See Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1971) (dividing
due process into procedural and substantive due process).
152. Id. Procedural due process refers to that limitation on permissable government
activities that is primarily concerned with an individual's right to a fair hearing whenever his life, liberty or property may be lost. Id.
153. Id. Substantive due process refers to that limitation on permissable governmental activities directed at restricting legislation in areas that would infringe on an
individual's life, liberty or property. Id.
154. See supra note 16.
155. See Comment, The California City versus Preemption By Implication, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966).
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ble means for protecting local health and welfare, and that the
objectives of rent control are a legitimate local concern, i.e., ensuring a heterogenous housing market, .stabilizing rents, and providing shelter for the poor. IllS Therefore, the potential result of
regulating private property justifies the exercise of the state's
police power, and establishes rent control as a legitimate means
for enforcing that result. 11l7 The court's conclusion that rent control is a legitimate means of enforcing local housing policy, however, reflects a general deference by the courts to economic legislation rather than an assumption that rent control is a means of
enforcing local housing policy.lII8
Rent control ordinances are not uniform, and the rational
relationship between the terms of an ordinance and its legitimate purpose raises a number of due process issues. Generally, if
there is any conceivable rationale for upholding economic legislation, the courts will do so.lII9 However, the Fisher court did
provide some guidelines as to when rent control ordinance provisions will be rationally related to their legitimate purposes.
When discussing the ordinance's rate of return standard,
the court referred to what constitutes a "reasonable" rate of return to landlords. When an economist discusses business costs,
he includes in those costs, the return that can be made if a business' capital were invested in another enterprise with similar
risks and information costs-the business' opportunity costs. ISO
This type of analysis accounts for the fact that if an investor can
earn more in another enterprise with comparable costs, it would
be illogical for him to remain in an enterprise earning less. When
an ordinance ties its rate of return to investment, its meaning is
156. See generally Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465 (the existence of an "emergency" is not required to establish the legitimacy of rent control).
157. [d. at 146, 550 P.2d at 1013, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 477. "It is the essence of the
police power to impose reasonable regulations upon private property rights to serve the
larger public good." [d.
158. See supra note 16.
159. [d.
160. See D.N. MCCLOSKEY, THE ApPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 551 (1982). If one can
obtain a lO~i, return on an investment in a tax free, risk free savings bond, but only a
9~i, return from renting property (after tax benefits, risk, and information costs have
been discounted), landlords would be effectively losing 1 % return; it would be irrational
for them to continue in the rental business when their investment is worth more elsewhere. [d.
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relative to the returns being made from other investments. 16l
The court recognized this relationship, and suggested that, "[A]
just and reasonable return on investment is one that is commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
comparable risks."162 Therefore, when the court referred to confiscatory rates, it was referring to those rates that would encourage landlords to divest themselves of their rental properties
and invest their monies elsewhere. 16s
This interpretation by the court of confiscatory rates, enables landlords to challenge a local ordinance by using statistics
that indicate the landlords' personal expenses and the returns
being made in other industries with comparable risks. Although
the landlords in Fisher raised challenges that were primarily
based on a facial attack of the ordinance and not an attack of
the ordinance as applied,164 it may still be possible to show that
an ordinance is too inflexible on its face to allow for returns
commensurate with other enterprises having comparable risks.
The returns in other industries analysis, however, is probably more appropriate for an attack of an ordinance as applied.
In most cases, a facial attack of an ordinance's rate of return
standard will be, in itself, unadvisable unless the standard sets
specific profit amounts. If an ordinance provides for specific
rents and adjustments without sufficient flexibility, a landlord
can then attack the ordinance as too inflexible to account for
changing returns in other industries and the relative effect on
rental properties.
A more logical facial attack of an ordinance would be a challenge to the procedural process. In the area of procedural due
process, the court seemed more willing to establish specific requirements for the legislature. 161i Although the Fisher court
161. [d. If a person decides to operate a business in a vacuum, that person may
decide that there is a minimum rate of return that would make the business worth his
effort. [d. In a multi-business environment, however, an investor is interested in maximum returns, and therefore, achieving a maximum return relative to other industries
with similar risks and information costs is what makes the business worth the effort. [d.
162. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
163. See supra notes 162 and 163.
164. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653-54, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
165. [d. at 690-91, 693 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19 (pointing out defects
caused by delays in the procedures for implementing rate adjustments).
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would still attempt to uphold an ordinance's procedural mechanism, the court has established certain requirements that could
potentially be used to attack an ordinance in the future. For example, as far as the rate adjustment mechanism in Berkeley's
ordinance, the court ruled that it would strike down any ordinance that caused a greater delay than was practically necessary
to fulfill the ordinance's objective. ISS This decision has, in effect,
mandated a general adjustment mechanism for certain cost increases. lS7 Although the court upheld the procedural mechanisms in Berkeley's ordinance, there is no reason why that particular challenge cannot be effective against other ordinances
that potentially cause a greater delay.
An example of how the court would continue to consider
any explanation for the rationality of a procedural mechanism is
the court's discussion of the rent withholding procedure. The
court insisted that one of the rent withholding provisions in the
Berkeley ordinance creates a "substantive defense to unlawful
detainer actions as a means of ensuring compliance with the ordinance. "lS8 This provision has two sections: one providing for
withholding to ensure compliance, and one creating a substantive defense to an unlawful detainer if a tenant has acted in
good faith.ls9 Significantly, the court determined from only one
section in the provision that the rent withholding procedure is
not procedural but is substantive. 170 Since the court's interpetation was based upon the defense established by the provision,
166. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
167. [d. at 687, 693 P.2d at 296, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court stated that a gen-

eral adjustment provision, "[W]i11 be required when the 'magnitude of the job to be
done' so demands." [d. The court also upheld Berkeley's current ordinance, as opposed
to the Birkenfeld ordinance, because it provided general adjustments for property tax
and utility increases whereas the Birkenfeld ordinance did not. [d. at 690-91, 693 P.2d at
298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
168. [d. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
169. See Ordinance, supra note 2, § 15(a)(I), (a)(2). For the text of the relevant rent
withholding provision, see supra note 29.
170. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729. One author
explains that, "Although much ink has been spilled by courts and commentators in the
attempt to separate questions of substance and process, the attempt can never be wholly
successful because the questions are functionally inseparable. See J.L. MASHAW, DUE
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 5 (1985). In the area of substance, a significant
process development occurs when the state is precluded from legislating in certain areas;
here, the process of who decides is at the forefront. [d. In the procedural area, questions
regarding who should decide an issue are fundamentally directed at what is to be decided; the substantive result is the overriding concern of the parties. [d.
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the court has provided drafters of rent control ordinances with a
means of escaping a procedural due process challenge; they simply have to add a qualified defense to the rent withholding
provision.

B.

PREEMPTION

California's Constitution allows all cities and counties to
make and enforce regulations and ordinances not in conflict with
general laws. l7l Historically, it has been up to the courts to decide what is meant by "in conflict with generallaws."172 Over the
years, courts have recognized two situations that may involve a
conflict between state and municipal legislation: when a state
statute expressly prohibits local regulation in the area (or a municipal regulation is duplicative of state law), and when a municipality imposes additional legislation in an area fully occupied
by the state. l7a The Fisher decision demonstrates the court's
preemption analysis in both of these areas.
The retaliatory eviction presumption is an example of a regulation expressly prohibited by the state. 174 According to the
court, this presumption in the ordinance is directly preempted
by one section in the Evidence Code.17& Part of this section provides, "Except as otherwise provided by law."l76 The crucial issue in this area is the definition of "law" and its further refinement into the term "statute,"177 and whether municipal
ordinances fit into that definition. In order to determine whether
a direct conflict exists between the language of a state statute
and a local ordinance, the inquiry is one of statutory construction, semantics, and a consideration of certain factors such as
custom.
The court's analysis was an historical one that examined the
relationship between the statutory code and local regulation
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
See Comment, supra note 155, at 604.
See id. at 604-05.
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 697, 593 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr at 724.
[d.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966).
See id. § 160 (1966).
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over time. 178 As explained by the court, the Evidence Code has
historically been an exclusive state affair; only the state can determine the rules of evidence and interpret them.179 Since local
ordinances cannot construe the rules of evidence, the Evidence
Code exception for statutes does not apply to municipal ordinances. This is a somewhat narrow view in contrast with other
situations in which the courts have interpreted the term statute
to include municipal ordinances. 18o However, the court was satisfied that the legislature never intended to include local ordinances within the definition of statute as it relates to the Evidence Code.
As far as the restraint on alienation of property issue, the
court found that the term statute does include municipal ordinances.l8l The court's rationale for this, however, was that prior
decisions had never applied the Civil Code's restraint on alienation language to statutes or ordinances; this language had always
been applied to private restraints. 182 The court's historical analysis in these two areas indicates that unless precedent has established that a statute was intended to exclude municipal ordinances, the court will uphold an ordinance. This approach to
direct preemption tends to relieve the court of personal responsibility; it is probably a result of the court's general deference to
economic legislation unless some actual conflict of purpose or
treatment can be proved.
The rent withholding provisions in the ordinance provide an
example of direct preemption by duplicative legislation and preemption by implication. In both areas, the court was concerned
with three statutes introduced by the landlords. 18s In general,
legislation must be reasonable and appropriate to the needs of a
particular locality.184 Since the court previously decided that the
rent withholding provisions are reasonably related to the legitimate needs of the city, the court only pointed to the distinctions
178. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698,693 P.2d at 303-04, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
179. [d. at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
180. See City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 823, 833-34, 271 P.2d 5,
15 (1954). See also King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta 277 U.S. 100, 102-14 (1928).
181. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
182. [d. at 693, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
183. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
184. Natural Milk Producers Assn. v. City & County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d
101, 109, 124 P.2d 25, 29 (1942).
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between the cited statutes and the relevant rent withholding
provisions. 185
The court determined that two of the statutes introduced
by the landlords are additional legislation rather than duplicative, and therefore, are not preemptive legislation. 18G According
to the court, the rent withholding provisions are a substantive
defense to eviction suits and a means of enforcing the ordinance,
and the cited statutes are unrelated to the rent withholding provisions. 187 The court determined that as additional legislation,
neither the quantity nor the content of the cited statutes imply
any legislative intent to exclude further regulation. 188 Furthermore, the court noted that the imposition of restraints in an
area that is not covered by state law, i.e., defenses to eviction
suits and enforcing compliance with ordinances, is a valid exercise of the city's police power. 189
The one statute cited by the landlords that does relate to
eviction suits was determined by the court to be unrelated to the
rent withholding provisions. leo As explained by the court, this
statute that defines unlawful detainer is procedural, whereas the
ordinance creates a substantive defense to an unlawful detainer
action. leI The court alleged that the "'mere fact that a city's
exercise of the police power creates such a defense does not
bring it into conflict with the state's statutory scheme.' "le2 On
this basis, the court did not find a direct conflict.
Due to the court's interpetation that the rent withholding
provisions create a substantive defense to unlawful detainer, and
that such a defense is not in conflict with statutory schemes relating to unlawful detainer, the court dismissed the presence of
185. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 704-09, 693 P.2d at 308-12, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 729-32.
186. [d. at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (§§ 1942 and 1947 of the Civil
Code were found not to be preemptive legislation).
187. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
188. [d.
189. [d.
190. [d. at 706, 693 P.2d at 309-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (§ 1161 of the Civil Procedure Code was found to be procedural, whereas the provisions in the ordinance were
found to create a substantive defense to an unlawful detainer action).
191. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
192. [d. (citing Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 149,550 P.2d 1016, 130
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1976».
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preemption by implication. 193 Although courts have stressed that
preemptive legislation may be evidenced by a· multiplicity of
statutes or a single enactment,194 the Fisher court observed that
the three statutes raised by the landlords are insufficient for this
purpose. 1911
Only one of the three factors that determines whether an
ordinance is preempted by implication could have applied; this
factor considers whether an area that is partly covered by state
law clearly indicates a paramount state concern that will not tolerate additional local action. 196 Even if one could argue that the
three cited statutes indicate a paramount state concern, the
court's conclusion that the relevant rent withholding provisions
are substantive defenses to eviction suits takes the ordinance
completely out of the range of the three statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fisher decision demonstrates the courts' strong deference to legislation regarding economic issues. The majority of
due process challenges involve attempts to get courts to consider
the real effect of a regulation in achieving its. intended purpose.
However, these challenges fail because the intended purposes of
regulations are subjective, and beyond the scope of the courts'
"any conceivable rationale" approach in economic legislation.
In Fisher, this deference by the courts also applied in the
area of preemption uphold. Not only did the California Supreme
Court uphold most of the provisions in the Berkeley rent control
ordinance that were attacked by the Berkeley landlords on preemption grounds, but the court also showed a creative disposition toward maintaining economic legislation. The court's determination that a rent withholding provision in the ordinance is a
substantive defense to an unlawful detainer is surprising. To
keep preemption in perspective, however, the court did rely on
an historical analysis where nontraditional interpetation was
unnecessary.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr, at 732.
See In re Martin, 221 Cal. App. 2d 14, 17, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1963).
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 709, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
See supra note 145.
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In both the due process and preemption areas, the court appears to have struck a balance between competing interests, although in favor of the local regulation. Even though a standard
due process analysis requires deference to economic legislation,
the court did provide some limitations. Among these limitations
are determinations by the court that long delays in rent adjustments due to inflation are confiscatory, and that a fair return on
investment requires a return commensurate with other industries with comparable risks. In the area of preemption, municipalities are limited from legislating in those areas traditionally
occupied exclusively by the state.
The balance established by the Fisher court seems to be a
compromise between a greater deference in the area of preemption and a slightly heightened standard of reasonableness in the
area of due process. Although the court demonstrated a creative
disposition toward upholding local ordinances against preemption challenges, the court's decision suggests that landlords are
entitled to profits sufficient to ensure their continued presence
in the rental market.

Scott T. Dunning*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

29

